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  1Abstract 
 
Member States have been trying to shield their welfare systems from European 
integration. Yet, as the recent European Court of Justice’s ruling on the Watts case 
has shown, Member States’ healthcare systems have to comply with the fundamental 
principles of the European Single Market. The obstacles to undergo non-emergency 
medical treatment in other Member States have been significantly reduced for 
European citizens. This paper analyzes how Member States’ healthcare systems have 
been affected by the development of European cross-border patient mobility using the 
concept of Europeanization. Drawing on Historical Institutionalism, it is argued that a 
process of institutional adaptation will occur in which the pace and the scale of the 
transposition of European legislation to domestic legislation depend on its fit with 
existing domestic institutions. Depending on their institutional set-ups, Germany’s 
social insurance system will show a lower degree of institutional misfit than 
Denmark’s national health system. Therefore Germany will try to upload different 
policy preferences to the European level than Denmark in order to lower the costs of 
their institutional adaptation to European obligations. It turns out that national health 
systems show a higher institutional misfit than social insurance systems: the costs of 
institutional adaptation are much higher for Denmark than for Germany. Hence, 
Denmark has been slower in transposing European legislation into national law than 
Germany. Conversely, Germany tries to upload different policy preferences to the 
European level than Denmark in order to lower the costs of their institutional 
adaptation to European obligations. The political preferences and interests that the 
Member States are trying to upload differ as much as their adaptive pressures. A 
restrictive interpretation of the Court’s jurisprudence is of much more importance to 
Denmark than to Germany, as Germany just tries to avoid further adaptive pressures. 
 
 
The paper is based on the Master’s thesis Unwelcome Europeanization – the 
development of European cross-border patient mobility, College of Europe, 
Department of European Political and Administrative Studies Bruges, 2007, available 
at  http://www.efpia.org/content/Default.asp?PageID=543. Please consult this 
document for an elaboration of the analysis below. 
 
 
 
 
  2“The health of the people is really the foundation upon which  
all their happiness and all their powers as a state depend.” 
 Benjamin Disraeli  
 
The virus of cross-border patient mobility has infected the sovereignty of the 
European Union’s Member States, and healthcare has become an issue on Brussels’ 
political agenda. The European Commission has evaluated recently different 
stakeholders’ responses to the latest consultation procedure on Community action in 
the field of healthcare. Regardless of Member States’ interests, cross-border patient 
mobility has thwarted their efforts to keep the organization of healthcare services an 
exclusively national policy-domain: European citizens turned the simple virus into a 
heavy flu as they sought reimbursement from their national health insurances for 
treatment undergone in another Member State. As the latter refused the 
reimbursement, patients took legal action. As a consequence the European Court of 
Justice reduced Member States’ room of maneuver in organizing their healthcare 
services autonomously in a series of several landmark decisions. This paper analyzes 
how Member States’ healthcare systems have been affected by the development of 
European cross-border patient mobility using the concept of Europeanization. The 
paper is structured in four parts: the first part outlines the different institutional set-
ups of national healthcare systems and EU competences in health policy. The second 
part deals with the phenomenon of  cross-border patient mobility, the subsequent 
rulings, as well as with the problems that arise from these rulings for Member States. 
The third part on Europeanization analyzes the domestic impact of cross-border 
patient mobility on Germany and Denmark. Drawing on Historical Institutionalism, it 
is argued that a process of institutional adaptation will occur. Due to their institutional 
set-ups, Germany’s social insurance system will show a lower degree of institutional 
misfit than Denmark’s national health system. Therefore Germany has tried to upload 
  3different policy preferences to the European level than Denmark in order to lower the 
costs of their institutional adaptation to European obligations. The conclusion forms 
the final part of the paper. 
 
1. National Healthcare Systems and EU Competences in Health Policy 
 
Health policy as a part of the state’s social policy is a core element of national 
welfare regimes
1. The citizens’ health has always been an important concern of 
national governments as health policies are considered to be an instrument of shaping 
a country’s society: A healthy population increases the economic productivity and 
tends to be more socially cohesive. Furthermore an extensive public healthcare 
service enhances the citizen’s confidence in the state. Unsurprisingly, citizens expect 
national governments to protect them from diseases and to guarantee a high standard 
of healthcare
2.  
The institutional features of the national healthcare systems affect the welfare 
regime as a whole. The most important fact is that healthcare is provided and financed 
in different ways. Whereas liberal and social-democratic welfare regimes have created 
national health systems that are funded by taxes, the conservative-corporatist welfare 
states have created social insurance systems, funded by payroll contributions: 
“Tax-based finance tends to imply universal coverage, the public ownership of 
health care facilities and a salaried medical profession. Insurance contributions, 
meanwhile, are paid into funds organized by occupation or region. Funds contract 
with what is usually a greater mixture of public and private providers of inpatient care, 
and with independent physicians paid according to the service they provide.”
3 
 
                                                 
1 Esping-Andersen distinguishes three different welfare regimes that exist in Europe: A liberal one as 
found in Anglo-Saxon states, a social-democratic one as found in Scandinavia and a conservative-
corporatist one as found in many countries of continental Europe. Cf. Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The 
Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990 
2 Monika Steffen, Wolfram Lamping and Juhani Lehto, “Introduction: The Europeanization of Health 
Policies” in Monika Steffen (ed.), Health Governance in Europe: Issues, Challenges and Theories, 
Oxon: Routledge, 2005, p. 1 
3 Richard  Freeman,  The Politics of Health in Europe, Manchester and New York: Manchester 
University Press, 2000, p. 5f 
  4Countries such as Germany, France, Austria and the Benelux countries have 
social insurance systems. Denmark, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Greece and Italy 
provide national health services
4. The countries selected for this paper therefore cover 
the two types of healthcare systems that exist in Europe. 
The difference between tax-funded systems and those funded by contributions 
becomes even clearer when looking at the reforms that these systems adopted after the 
economic recession of the 1970s and 1980s. In order to lower the costs, national 
healthcare systems introduced measures such as reducing the number of medical 
treatments covered by the system, abolishing fee-for-service payments, and using 
physicians as gatekeepers who have to decide if a patient’s treatment with a specialist 
is necessary or not. With regard to hospital treatments, waiting lists have been 
established to lower the costs of inpatient care. Looking at the comprehensive control 
that is exercised by the state over providers such as physicians and hospitals, which 
have to regulate the access to treatment, we can also speak of managed care
5. Social 
insurance systems, on the other hand, have limited the possibility of patients to choose 
freely their physicians for treatment and introduced or increased cost sharing between 
sickness funds and patients with regard to pharmaceuticals and inpatient care
6. 
Given these reforms, and approached from a rather economic perspective, it 
seems that health policy is more a technical problem than a political one: the different 
ways of organizing and providing health services just seem to be related to the costs 
and the efficiency that such a health system creates. Yet, as Freeman points out, “the 
health system is coterminous with public (state) intervention: health policy problems 
                                                 
4 Ibid., p. 6 
5François-Xavier Merrien,  Raphaël Parchet and Antoine Kernen, L’État social: Une perspective 
internationale, Paris: Armand Colin, 2005, p. 310 
6 Ibid., p. 318 
  5are problems of and for the state”
7. This is the case as health systems do not only 
regulate the access to healthcare and its financing, but they also regulate the interests 
of the pharmaceutical industry, the development of medical technologies, and regulate 
at the same time struggles between different interest groups such as physicians’ 
associations, patients’ associations and the pharmaceutical industry’s associations
8. 
Keeping in mind the important role that the state plays in regulating healthcare, it is 
not surprising that EU Member States consider healthcare policies as a genuinely 
national competence: 
“There is no such thing as a European healthcare system, and as long as 
decisions on financing, organization and service delivery are taken at a national level, 
there is little chance of one existing”
9. 
 
Yet, whereas healthcare, which is defined as the treatment of illnesses 
essentially, stays a national competence, Member States have ceded competences to 
the EU in public health, which means the management of collective health risks
10. 
According to article 3 TEC, the European Community shall contribute to a “high level 
of health protection”
11. This aim and the relevant competences are specified by article 
152 TEC. Even though the EC has been developing different activities in health 
policy since the 1970s, article 152 was only introduced in the Treaty of Maastricht
12. 
Before the introduction of article 152 TEC, it was mostly secondary legislation that 
regulated issues relating to health policy on the basis of other Treaty articles. Their 
aim was to facilitate the free movement of workers throughout the Community and 
                                                 
7 Richard Freeman, op. cit. p. 8 
8 Ibid. 
9 Monika Steffen, Wolfram Lamping and Juhani Lehto, op. cit. p. 3 
10 For the definitions of healthcare and public health, Ibid., p. 6 
11 Consolidated version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/treaties/dat/EC_consol.html, 23 April 2007 
12  T a m a r a  K .  H e r v e y  a n d  J e a n  V .  M c H a l e ,  Health Law and the European Union, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 73 
  6therefore tried to ensure that a worker moving to another Member State would receive 
healthcare benefits
13.  
The main legislation relevant to the topic is Regulation 1408/71 EC, adopted 
under article 42 TEC. The Regulation, based on the principle of non-discrimination on 
the ground of nationality, ensures that EU citizens staying in another Member State 
have access to the other Member State’s healthcare systems: firstly workers, students 
and tourists are covered in cases of emergency medical treatment, using the so called 
E111 form to get medical treatment. This form has since been replaced by the 
European Health Insurance Card (EHIC). Secondly the Regulation permitted medical 
treatment in another Member State if the national healthcare system could not provide 
a specific treatment. Yet, in order to be treated abroad, prior authorization of the 
national health authorities or the relevant sickness funds is necessary (E112 form)
 14. 
In 1981, the Regulation was amended in order to prevent patients from claiming 
financial support from their national health insurance for a treatment in another 
Member State that is not covered at home. Furthermore the amendment wanted to 
make sure that patients could not circumvent waiting lists by claiming to have a ‘right 
to be treated’ in another Member State. Hence patients did not have the right to 
receive a treatment that was not covered by the health insurance of the home Member 
State
15.  
                                                 
13 Vassilis G. Hatzopoulos, “Do the Rules on Internal Market Affect National Health Care Systems?” 
in Martin McKee, Elias Mossialos and Rita Baeten, (eds)., The Impact of EU Law on Health Care 
Systems, Brussels, P.I.E Peter Lang, 2002, p. 124 
14 Tamara K. Hervey and Jean V. McHale, op. cit. p. 115 
15 Ibid., p. 116 
  7The introduction of article 152 TEC, finally, created a legal basis concerning 
health policy. The article set a limit to any creeping EU competence in the field of 
health policy that might occur due to the legislation already adopted under other treaty 
articles
16. It limits the EU’s activities concerning health policy to coordination 
between the Member States, who in turn are obliged to coordinate public health 
policies with the Commission. Yet, the article only covers illnesses and disease 
prevention, which led the Commission to set up action plans for health. The aims of 
article 152 TEC are “thus essentially concerned with public health, in the sense of 
health protection and promotion of good health carried out on a collective basis, rather 
than individual-health related entitlements”
  17. Hence, Member States made sure in 
paragraph 5 of art. 152 that “Community action in the field of public health shall fully 
respect the responsibilities of the Member States for the organization and delivery of 
health services and medical care”
18. On the basis of the different provisions regarding 
public health on one side and healthcare on the other side, one could argue that EU 
health policy is a “divided policy field”
19.  However, with regard to the complexity of 
national health systems where public health and healthcare intertwine, it seems 
questionable if this legal dichotomy established by article 152 TEC reflects reality
20.  
It remains even more a question when looking at the phenomenon of cross-border 
patient-mobility that entailed several European Court of Justice (ECJ) rulings to the 
disadvantage of Member States’ intentions stipulated in the article.  
                                                 
16 Tamara K. Hervey and Jean V. McHale, op. cit. p. 74 
17 Cf. Ibid. 
18 Consolidated version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, op. cit. 
19 Monika Steffen, Wolfram Lamping and Juhani Lehto, op. cit. p. 5 
20 Tamara K. Hervey and Jean V. McHale, op. cit., p. 80 
  82. Cross-Border Patient Mobility and the European Court of Justice Rulings 
Cross-border patient mobility can be defined as any “movement which 
involves patients going from one country to another”
21. Patients can have different 
incentives for getting non-emergency treatment in other Member States.  Even if the 
average patient still likes to be treated locally in a familiar environment, there are 
several factors that motivate patients to leave their country and seek medical treatment 
in another EU Member State. These factors include the availability of certain medical 
treatments, high costs of medical treatments, and a low perceived quality of the 
healthcare services in the home country. Especially the first factor is important for 
cross-border patient mobility: Firstly, it might be the case that a special kind of 
treatment exists in a Member State but cannot be available within a given time limit. 
This relates, for example, to waiting lists in national health systems for inpatient care.  
Secondly, in some Member States a special medical treatment requiring hi-tech 
equipment might not exist at all, and thus patients are usually allowed to go abroad for 
treatment
22.  Medical services in border regions constitute another important factor: in 
cases where a patient shares the same linguistic or cultural background with the 
people living in the other Member State, the individual might decide to get a 
treatment there instead of traveling inside the home country.
23 
Taking all these factors into account, the number of people seeking treatment 
abroad still seems to be rather low. The estimated figure for patients crossing borders 
is about 1% of all patients treated by national healthcare systems. Yet, in border-
regions this percentage may rise to about 7 to 9% of patients, and there seems to be 
                                                 
21  Irene A. Glinos and Rita Baeten, A Literature Review of Cross-Border Patient Mobility in the 
European Union, Brussels: Europe for Patients Project, 2006, p. 18 
22 Ibid., p. 6 
23 Ibid. 
  9potential for this number to grow due to the aforementioned factors
24. Some of these 
patients use a commercial middleman who arranges treatments in other Member 
States, usually if a treatment at home is not covered or for which waiting lists exist
25. 
Some of these patients that have crossed the border for treatment for different reasons 
have claimed reimbursement for their medical treatments by national sickness funds 
or by the national health service. After having been refused to receive reimbursement, 
some of these patients went as far as to take legal action. The ECJ subsequently 
delivered several rulings that have put the “multi-faceted phenomenon”
26 of cross-
border patient mobility on the European political agenda and, as a result, have worried 
Member State governments.   
The ECJ rulings on cross-border patient mobility and the delivery of 
healthcare services left Member States the prerogative to organize their healthcare 
services and to determine the scope and the content of entitlement to inpatient and a 
physician’s care. However, the ECJ ruled that healthcare services are no exception to 
the Treaty regulations on services in general.  The national provision of healthcare can 
only restrict the free movement of patients if these restrictions are objective, non-
discriminatory and subjected to possible judicial review: 
The ECJ ruled in the Kohll/ Decker case that if a healthcare system allows 
seeing any physician in the home country, this would now mean that patients could 
have the permission to see any physician in the EU
27.  Furthermore, treatment by a 
physician in another Member State would not be subject to prior authorization 
                                                 
24 Figures mentioned in a speech given by Robert Madelin, European Commission, Director General of 
DG SANCO, EHMA conference on health services, Brussels, 30 March 2007 
25 Irene A. Glinos and Rita Baeten, op. cit., p.6 
26 Ibid., p. 5 
27  Cf. European Court of Justice, Preliminary Ruling, Raymond Kohll vs. Union des Caisses de 
Maladie, case C-158/96, 28 April 1998, point 55 
  10anymore, though only the amount that would have been reimbursed at home will be 
granted for treatment abroad as ruled in the Müller-Fauré / Van Riet cases
28. 
Besides the already existing right for EU patients to receive emergency 
treatment and authorized planned hospital treatment in another Member State, the ECJ 
ruled in the Geraets-Smits/Peerbooms cases that patients can obtain an authorization 
and reimbursement in another member state if a waiting list for an operation leads to 
an “undue delay”, without however defining exactly what this term implies in 
practice
29. The ECJ’s legal (not medical) experts also intervened with the same ruling 
in medical standard-setting. As the national medical opinion will not be accepted 
anymore for the decision on prior authorization on hospital treatment abroad, the ECJ 
translated medical standards into “Euro-Speak”
30  by demanding that national 
authorities would have to take international medical standards into consideration. 
Finally, in the last ruling of 2006 on the Watts case, the ECJ decided that the prior 
rulings would also apply to national health systems and not only to social insurance 
systems
31. Inpatient care remains, however, subject to prior authorization. This has to 
depend on objective criteria, and a refusal cannot merely be based on the existence of 
waiting lists in the national healthcare system. Member States’ room of maneuver to 
organize their healthcare systems thus has been affected and the free movement of 
patients has been facilitated
32.  This leads to a fundamental problem for member 
states: 
                                                 
28   European Court of Justice, Preliminary Ruling, V.G. Müller-Fauré vs. Onderlinge 
Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen UA, and E.E.M. van Riet vs. Onderlinge 
Waarborgmaatschappij ZAO Zorgverzekeringen, case C-385/99, 13 May 2003 
29 European Court of Justice, Preliminary Ruling, B.S.M. Geraets-Smits vs. Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ 
and H.T.M. Peerbooms vs. Stichting CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen, case C-157/99, 12 July 2001, point 
108 
30 Cf. L. Scott Greer, “Uninvited Europeanization: Neofunctionalism and the EU in Health Policy”,  
Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 13:1, January 2006, p. 142 
31 European Court of Justice, Primary Ruling; The Queen, on the application of Yvonne Watts vs. 
Bedford Primary Care Trust, Secretary of State for Health, case C-372/04, 16 May 2006 
32 Tamara K. Hervey and Jean V. McHale, op. cit. p. 133f 
  11“By facilitating the free movement of patients, the ECJ subjects the 
national/insurance health systems to indirect competition amongst them, hence 
pushing them to rationalize and promote efficiency. At a time where all the systems of 
social insurance in Europe go through a profound crisis – for economic, demographic, 
olitical and other reasons – this choice of the ECJ may prove particularly 
burden
 
 States according to article 226 TEC with regard to cross-border 
patient 
                                                
p
some, at least in the short-term”
33. 
Given the above development EU Member States did not have much of a 
choice than asking the Commission to explore what problems arise from the rulings 
and which actions could possibly be taken to solve them. Furthermore, the 
Commission is ready to take action against Member States that do not comply with 
the Court’s rulings: in 2007, there were about 20 pending infringement procedures 
against 10 Member
mobility
34.  
The possible competition of healthcare systems implies wider issues such as a 
EU wide medical standard setting, in which the Commission has taken account of 
Member States’ reticence to cede sovereignty in its 2007 consultation for a directive 
on health services
35. It suggests measures such as shaping a framework for centers of 
reference for rare diseases, and it wants to apply the Open Method of Coordination 
(OMC) in order to exchange views on health innovation and the assessment of health 
systems. The OMC seems to be an adequate proposal, as regulatory measures by the 
Commission would be rejected by national governments. Member States can 
participate voluntarily in the OMC, but it also has – to stick to medical terms – some 
‘side effects’: they would have to evaluate their healthcare systems, and their 
respective strengths and weaknesses could become apparent. The Commission also 
avoids any reference to ‘harmonization’, and the OMC thus usually satisfies all actors 
 
33 Vassilis   Hatzopoulos, “Current Problems of Social Europe,” Research Papers in Law, Bruges: 
College of Europe, 2007, retrieved from www.coleurop.be, 21 January 2008, p. 13 
34 Presentation given by Geraldine Fages, European Commission, DG Internal Market and Services, 
EHMA conference on health services, Brussels, 30 March 2007 
35 Commission of the European Communities, Communication: Consultation regarding Community 
action on health services, SEC(2006) 1195/4, Brussels, 26 September 2006, p. 5f 
  12involved in the political process when sensitive issues such as healthcare are at stake. 
Nevertheless Lamping claims that, “the OMC could be both an effective functional 
equivalent for the lack of EU competences in social policy core areas, and an effective 
catalyst for the smooth institutional harmonization of the harder cores of national 
social security systems”
36. Given this potential for domestic changes due to the ECJ’s 
rulings, the next part of the paper will analyze the domestic impact of cross-border 
atient mobility by using the concept of Europeanization. 
3. Euro
 
 could not confirm that a 
general
                                                
p
 
peanization and Healthcare Systems 
Since the middle of the 1990s, the concept of Europeanization has become 
popular amongst political scientists in order to assess the EU’s impact on Member 
States’ policies, politics and polities. The concept is used to analyze the impact’s 
scope as well as the final outcomes
37. Concentrating on the EU’s impact on Member 
States therefore means trying to explain domestic processes and outcomes due to 
European integration rather than trying to categorize the EU itself.
38 Most of the early 
studies on Europeanization expected to find a convergence between Member States 
that would lead to an enhanced decentralization, cooperation or even centralization 
among domestic political actors. Yet, empirical studies
 convergence occurred between Member States
39. 
During the last years scholars have developed different approaches to assess 
the EU’s domestic impact using a variety of analytical tools stemming mostly from 
 
36 Wolfram Lamping, op. cit., p. 27 
37 Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, “Europeanization: The Domestic Impact of European Union 
Politics” in Jørgensen Knud, Mark A. Pollack  and Ben Rosamond (eds.), Handbook of European 
Union Politics, London: Sage Publications Ltd, 2006, p. 483f 
38 Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli (eds.), The Politics of Europeanization Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003, p. 4 
39 Tanja A. Börzel, “Europanization: How the EU Interacts with Its Member States” in Simon Bulmer 
and Christian Lesquesne (eds.), The Member States of the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005, p. 48 
  13comparative politics. Two of the most prominent approaches analyze processes of 
institutional adaptation and the adaptation of policies and policy processes. The first 
of these both approaches draws on historical institutionalism and analyzes how 
national administrative institutions adapt to demands and obligations that EU 
membership implies
40. But administrative institutions themselves might not only 
adapt to
nces and interests in the 
 a sufficiently stronger impact over the longer term, to establish 
distinct paths of development in policies and institutions”
41. 
 
e 
attribut
                                                
 obligations, they also could shape political interests: 
“Historical institutionalism lends itself to studies in which domestic (and/or 
EU) institutions haven an intervening effect on actor prefere
short term, and
 
Studies of the latter category of Europeanization analyze the EU’s impact on 
national policies, such as the possible restrictions that European law can entail for 
national policies. The following analysis will aim at assessing the EU’s impact on 
national healthcare services being part of welfare systems that are “built on strong 
historical and institutional legacies”
42. The focus of the analysis will be on the 
institutional adaptation that can occur in Member States due to the described process 
of unintended integration. Several alternative definitions of Europeanization have 
been suggested, depending on the focus of the different research categories. 
Consequentially, the definition that will be employed here defines Europeanization as 
“a process of change in national institutional and policy practices that can b
ed to European integration,”
43 which has been developed by Hix and Goetz. 
Referring to this top-down dimension of EU-Member State relations, previous 
research has identified the causal mechanisms that can determine the EU’s domestic 
impact. The impact’s character and strength can vary across the different countries 
 
40 Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli, op. cit., p. 7 
41 Cf. Ibid. 
42 Cf. Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen, “The Europeanization of Welfare – The Domestic Impact of Intra-
European Social Security”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 43, No. 5, 2005, p. 1031 
43 Cf. Hix and Goetz cited in Ibid., p. 1033 
  14and policies. Such a variation is best to be explained by the ‘goodness of fit’ of 
national institutions and policies with European rules, as well as by intervening 
variables or ‘mediating factors’ that filter the impact on Member States. If European 
policies or institutions differ from the domestic ones (‘misfit’), Member States will 
feel a need for change. There are two different types of misfits that can entail national 
changes: the first one is the so called ‘policy misfit’ designating a situation in which 
national policies are incongruent with European law
44. As regards the impacts on 
national healthcare systems the second type, namely ‘institutional misfit’, is likely to 
occur as Member States have developed a distinct institutional set-up of national 
healthcare services according to their respective welfare system. Generally speaking, 
European law can challenge in this case national procedures and rules as well as the 
collective understandings that are attached to them in Member States. It is not only 
European law that can cause an institutional misfit. Also soft forms of integration 
such as the OMC can represent a challenge to national institutions
45. However, both 
differ i
late their meaning. The coerciveness of European rules and 
norms provides us with a sense of the impact and a formal picture how constrained 
Membe
 
gement procedures against Member States if 
they do not comply with European law. 
                                                
n their coerciveness, 
 “and thus whether national actors are obliged to implement them, the ability 
to sanction non-compliance, as well as the extent to which they leave space for 
national actors to trans
r States are”
46.  
The coerciveness of European institutionalized rules regarding healthcare 
services provided by the national systems is high due to two factors: The first one 
consists of the ECJ’s several binding rulings on cross-border patient mobility as well 
as of the ECJ’s interpretation of Regulation 1408/71 EC. The second factor is the 
Commission’s intention to initiate infrin
 
44 Tanja A. Börzel, op. cit., p. 50 
45 Ibid. 
46 Cf. Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen, op. cit., p. 1034 
  15Yet, the adaptive pressure that Member States will perceive is “not decided by 
supranational institutionalization alone; rather, it is equally determined by how that 
process relates to established national institutions”
47 . Thus, the organizational 
structure of the two existing types of national healthcare systems is a mediating factor. 
We can therefore expect that social insurance systems will show a different degree of 
institutional misfit than national health systems and therefore cause also different 
adaptive pressures on Member States. 
Due to these differing adaptive pressures, the consequential outcomes of 
institutional adaptations can vary considerably. The Europeanization literature has 
distinguished five broad categories of possible outcomes
48:  
(1) Institutional inertia designates a Member State’s resistance against 
institutional changes and reaffirmation of the existing institutional set-ups. In these 
cases the Commission usually opens infringement procedures in order to increase the 
adaptive pressure
49.  
(2) An even more ‘acute’ outcome of resistance is retrenchment. This means a 
case of national non-compliance by reinforcing the national institutional set-up. As a 
consequence the already existing misfit increases
50. 
(3) In the case of absorption the European rules are incorporated by Member 
States into their domestic institutions and policies without modifying the existing 
structures. Thus, the degree of change will be low
51. 
(4) Member State can also accommodate existing institutions and policies to 
European rules without changing the core features of the system. For example new 
                                                 
47 Cf. Ibid, p. 1035 
48 Tanja A. Börzel, op. cit., p. 58 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid., p. 59 
  16institutions or policies are created and simply ‘annexed’. The degree of change is 
therefore modest
52. 
(5) The most substantial change is transformation. In this case Member States 
replace the previously existing institutions and policies by new ones. Usually the core 
features of the system will be fundamentally changed
53. 
Given the different adaptive pressures and the variable consequential 
outcomes of Europeanization it is quite unlikely that Member States with different 
healthcare systems will face convergence, at least as far as their core features are 
concerned. As Börzel states, “we should expect at best some ‘clustered convergence’ 
among Member States facing similar pressures for adaptation”
54.  
However, the outcomes of Europeanization on national healthcare systems 
will not depend only on already existing European rules: “Member States are not 
merely passive receivers of European demands for domestic change”
55. As a function 
of the experienced coerciveness of European rules and their perceived institutional 
misfit, Member States in return may try to find solutions which affect the bottom-up 
dimension between them and the EU: those with a perceived strong misfit will try to 
influence or shape European policies and institutions in such a way that the domestic 
misfit is reduced
56 . This attempt to ‘up-load’ their national preferences to the 
European level can reduce the need and the costs of institutional adaptation. 
In order to analyze the impact of the development that has taken place in 
healthcare policy Germany carrying a social insurance system has been selected. It 
will be juxtaposed to Denmark’s national health system. Both systems show distinct 
institutional features: the German healthcare system is governed more or less 
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  17independently from the federal government through  sickness funds and physician’s 
associations. Therefore healthcare is financed by private institutions, and providers 
(such as hospitals) are either public or private. Yet, they work in a highly regulated 
framework of legal provisions
57.  
The compulsory insurance system consists of a vast number of sickness funds. 
These sickness funds can be divided in two large categories: regular funds and 
substitute funds. Both kinds of funds are subject to social insurance legislation, as laid 
down in the Fifth German Social Code (fünftes Sozialgesetzbuch or SGB V). Regular 
sickness funds usually include the public sickness funds of companies, regional 
sickness funds, and those of special occupational groups. Substitute funds are usually 
organized nationwide and mainly insure white-collar workers. Together, regular and 
substitute funds insure about 88% of the German population. The remaining citizens 
are usually insured with private sickness funds who are mainly state officials or high 
earners.  
The benefits of German sickness funds cover physician and specialist 
treatment as well as inpatient care and income maintenance for ill workers. Patients 
are also free to choose their physician, although they have to pay a fee of 10€ if they 
are not referred to a specialist by their General Practitioner. Physicians who are 
contracted with the sickness funds are paid on a fee-for-service system but may not 
exceed a global budget assigned to them (benefits-in-kind system). 51% of the 
hospitals are owned by the German states (Länder) or by local authorities (Kommunen) 
whereas non-profit organizations run about 35% of hospitals. The remainders are run 
as business. Hospital physicians are mainly salaried employees
58.  
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  18In contrast to Germany, Denmark carries a national health system. The system 
is mainly financed by taxes and most of the services provided are run by the state. 
Physicians and nurses are civil servants receiving fixed salaries. Hospitals are run and 
owned by the counties who also regulate physician’s activities. They have wide-
ranging powers in organizing the supply of healthcare services according to the 
counties’ needs. The Ministry of the Interior and Health sets the broad guidelines for 
the healthcare system.  
General Practitioners have the function of gatekeepers by deciding if medical 
treatment of a specialist is necessary (so called “family doctor”). They also decide if a 
patient has to be referred to a hospital, except for cases where emergency treatment is 
necessary. In order to plan the development of capacities, hospitals operate waiting 
lists. Denmark has two categories of healthcare insurance: People insured under 
Group 1, which covers about 97 percent of the population, are obliged to register with 
a General Practitioner, but are fully reimbursed for medical treatment. People insured 
under Group 2 can choose freely their General Practitioner, but costs of medical 
treatment are only reimbursed partially
59. 
Given these institutional differences, we can expect that European law will 
challenge national procedures and rules as well as the collective understandings that 
are attached to the German and Danish healthcare system in different ways, as 
Sindbjerg Martinsen states: 
“Free movement and the right to cross-border social security are first and 
foremost compatible with an individualistic insurance principle, where there is a 
direct relationship between social entitlements and contributions. On the other hand, 
the European imperatives contradict the principles of the Danish welfare model, since 
it grants universal social protection on the basis of residence, with no contributory 
demands”
60. 
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  19As a consequence of the above reasoning on Europeanization, the following 
hypothesis will be tested: 
The integration process of healthcare policy will result in a subsequent 
Europeanization of national healthcare services. Germany’s social insurance system 
will show a lower degree of institutional misfit than Denmark’s national health 
system. Therefore Germany will try to upload different policy preferences to the 
European level than Denmark. 
 
Several different questions arise from this hypothesis: how does cross-border 
patient mobility affect these countries? Which institutional features are affected? 
What are their reactions and what are their resulting political preferences in the 
political process at the European level? Therefore the following part will have a 
corresponding structure to these questions.  
3.1  Germany: A Social Insurance System  
Cross-border patient mobility 
Data on cross-border patient mobility is not coherent and there is no standard 
for measuring patient’s movements throughout the EU. Most information is 
fragmented, too. Therefore the examples that will follow are taken from interviews 
and case studies. 
In Germany most patients going abroad for medical treatment live in border 
regions. Another group consists of tourists, workers and pensioners. The latter often 
seek treatment in Southern European countries such as Spain, where they reside for at 
least some months per year. Patients who intentionally seek treatment often go abroad 
to Poland or Hungary for dental treatment
61. An example for this movement of 
patients is the Polish city Szczecin near the German border. German patients usually 
seek dental treatment there, as it is about 50% cheaper than back home. The Polish 
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  20clinics offer package arrangements for foreign patients, including accommodation and 
travel. These clinics are especially important for Germans, as dental prosthetics are 
not paid anymore by German sickness funds. Even before the healthcare reform of 
2004, when dental prosthetics were still paid, patients had to bear a co-payment of 
about 50%
62. Apart from this case study concerning dental treatment, German 
authorities could not identify large numbers of patients seeking treatment abroad: 
“According to the data available so far, the possibility of cross-border 
healthcare has not led to a sizable take-up of these services by the insured in Germany. 
The amounts spent by statutory health insurance funds on outpatient and inpatient 
services abroad are clearly below 0.5% whereby this number does not even 
distinguish between EU countries and non-EU countries”
63. 
 
As far as patients in border regions are concerned, they mostly profit from 
cross-border regional cooperation in the Euregios. Some local hospitals cooperate 
with their counterparts in other Member States, and some regions also cooperate in 
the mutual supply of blood products. Furthermore, some regions have initiated 
projects on specific diseases
64. 
According to the German government the number of European patients 
coming to Germany for inpatient care is negligible, too. However, some healthcare 
providers seem to be interested in offering medical treatment to non-nationals. An 
example of this willingness was a temporary agreement between Norway and the 
State of Schleswig-Holstein to treat Norwegian patients in local hospitals. But a 
general trend of increasing numbers of patients coming to Germany is not identifiable. 
Despite this fact, some German states see the intended creation of medical centers of 
reference for rare diseases as a chance to attract foreign patients and to use their 
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  21hospitals to full capacity
65. Hospitals themselves have also been active in trying to 
attract non-national patients: a group of about 110 German hospitals has founded the 
‘GerMedic’ group that tries to promote German inpatient care abroad
66. 
Institutional adaptations 
In 2004, Germany codified the provisions of the ECJ’s rulings in its SGB V. 
Therefore citizens insured by a German sickness fund can consume healthcare 
services in other Member States without referring specifically to the Court’s 
jurisdiction. Sickness funds have been allowed to conclude contracts with healthcare 
providers in other EU Member States. Besides a growing use of these contracts with 
non-national providers, German border regions have been active, too: 
“In the border regions, numerous framework agreements have already been 
concluded in order to avoid, inter alia, problems with the billing of inpatient services. 
Co-operation contracts concluded locally by health insurance funds with foreign 
service providers that are tailored to the specific demand and situation in a certain 
region, are usually a suitable means of allowing people living near the border freedom 
of choice without jeopardizing the steering capacity and affordability of the national 
health care system”
67. 
 
Furthermore, a framework agreement has been concluded with France, which became 
effective in the spring of 2007. This framework agreement comprises not only cross-
border cooperation for medical treatment but also emergency medical services
68.  
However, national courts also have played an important role for adapting Germany’s 
healthcare system to European obligations: in the period from 1972 to 2002, an 
average of about 5 cases per year was referred by national courts to the ECJ for 
infringements of Regulation 1408/71 EC by German sickness funds
69. 
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  22Political preferences  
For Germany, as for all Member States, safeguarding its sovereignty and 
national competence for the organization of its healthcare service is of utmost 
importance. Therefore Germany has a positive attitude towards legal instruments such 
as Regulations, as far as they establish legal certainty for patients but also for Member 
States. The German government would like to clarify the definition of health services 
in a way that ensures that Member States’ competences regarding healthcare services 
are not impaired. Even though the German healthcare system does not operate waiting 
lists for hospital treatment, a definition of “undue delay” should be provided by a 
European legal act, too. As far as the control of the quality of medical treatments 
abroad is concerned, it should remain with the respective national healthcare system
70. 
Interestingly enough, Germany is also in favor of better information for patients, but 
with a certain number of limits: 
“The insured must have easy access to information on the conditions under 
which they are entitled to receive treatment abroad. The information can be limited to 
only the conditions under which treatment abroad is covered. Information on which 
facility in which Member State can provide the necessary treatment, should the need 
arise, may not be demanded. It is up to the patients themselves to obtain this 
information with the assistance of their attending physician or the facilities in the 
Member State in which they are seeking treatment. No Member State can be expected 
to have information available on service providers in all other Member States”
71. 
 
This indicates that Germany wants to create legal certainty, but certainly does 
not want to encourage patients unnecessarily to go abroad. As far as the other issues 
related to cross-border patient mobility are concerned, Germany welcomes the 
suggested measures by the Commission such as the creation of a network that should 
ensure patient safety. In summary, Germany does not see that its supply of healthcare 
services could be compromised by the treatment of other EU nationals, but does not 
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  23wish that European action regarding healthcare is expanded noticeably: “Measures 
that go beyond cross-border cooperation and task-sharing cooperation among care 
facilities including reciprocal supplementation of services provided by the care 
facilities are not necessary”
72. 
Germany has adapted institutionally to the obligations that the ECJ’s rulings 
implied: it has simply codified the ruling’s provisions in its SGB V. Furthermore 
Germany has allowed its sickness funds to contract with healthcare providers from 
other Member States. This indicates that Germany has incorporated European rules 
into its domestic institutions without modifying the existing structures of its 
healthcare system. Therefore the Europeanization of the German healthcare system is 
low as absorption is the result of the institutional adaptation. This low degree of 
adaptation therefore also implies a previously low institutional misfit of social 
insurance systems. 
Given its political preferences for Community action on health services, 
Germany tries to avoid any further unwelcome Europeanization by pointing out that 
any Community action which touches upon Member States’ competences in 
healthcare policy would be unacceptable. Hence, Germany does not only try to avoid 
any further loss of sovereignty but also tries to avoid more costs of institutional 
adaptation by uploading its preferences. The German position also mentioned the 
beneficial effects of cross-border cooperation in Europe. Cross-border patient 
mobility therefore does not only imply problems but might bring about economic 
benefits. 
As a German interviewee explained, Germany could react to the ECJ’s rulings 
in a quite relaxed way, as its healthcare system is comparatively well equipped. There 
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  24seems to be no pressure for patients to go abroad, as for example no waiting lists for 
inpatient care exist. Moreover Germany would not be afraid of implementing the 
Court’s jurisprudence as long as the national healthcare system’s fundamental 
principles would be respected
73. This seems to be a good summary of a Member State 
reaction with a social insurance system to the EU’s domestic impact. 
3.2  Denmark: A National Health Service 
Cross-border patient mobility 
About 500 Danish patients per year seek medical treatment abroad, and 
citizens living in border regions might seek medical treatment in either Germany or 
Sweden
74. Even though this number seems to be quite small, it is a significant 
increase in comparison to the 70 patients
75 that claimed reimbursement of medical 
treatment in another EU Member State in 2000. An example for a middleman 
organizing treatment for Danish patients abroad is PatientLink. The organization 
represents 8 German hospitals that have treated about 265 Danish patients between 
2002 and 2005. The latter usually need hip- or knee replacements. Since 2003, Danish 
cancer patients have the possibility ask for authorization to go to another Member 
State for experimental treatment. This authorization is granted if all possible treatment 
options have been already tried. About 310 patients made use of this option
76. 
Institutional adaptations 
Following the Kohll/Decker rulings of the Court, the Danish government 
created an interministerial working group that had to analyze the possible impacts on 
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  25the Danish healthcare system. In 1998, Denmark’s interpretation of the case law was 
that it only applied to Luxemburg, and that hospital treatment would not fall under the 
Treaty definitions of ‘services’ as hospital treatment was free of charge. The working 
group’s final report followed that opinion as far as hospital treatment is concerned, 
but admitted that the principles of the internal market were under certain conditions 
applicable to healthcare services. A reform followed the report in 2000, which 
allowed patients to purchase certain medical services in other Member States with 
reimbursement from the Danish health insurance. Patients of Group 2 could seek 
dental, chiropractic and physiotherapeutic treatment abroad. In 2002, after the 
Geraets-Smits/Peerbooms ruling, which clarified that hospital care constitutes a 
service, Denmark was not obliged to change its legislation. Nonetheless it had an 
impact on the Danish government. In the same year, a reform stipulated the right of 
Danish patients to seek treatment elsewhere if a public hospital could not provide 
medical treatment within the delay of two months
77. Between 2002 and 2003, about 
26,000 patients used that scheme. Of these, 1, 3 percent were treated in other Member 
States, mainly Sweden and Germany. One year later, almost 42,000 patients benefited 
from the right to choose freely a hospital in Denmark or abroad. Thus, the Danish 
healthcare system does not meet certain needs of patients. However, most of the 
demand has been absorbed by the private sector
78. 
The subsequent Müller-Fauré/Van Riet and Watts judgments have clarified 
that the principles of the internal market apply to all healthcare systems. Therefore, 
the restrictive application of the Kohll/Decker judgment in Denmark since 2002 is not 
in line anymore with European legal obligations
79. Concerning these last two rulings, 
                                                 
77 Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen, op. cit., p. 1043 
78 Irene A. Glinos, Rita Baeten, op.cit., p. 60 
79 Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen, op. cit., p. 1045 
  26Denmark has not changed its legislation yet, as it wanted to wait for the adoption of a 
European Directive
80. 
Political preferences  
Denmark would want to stipulate in a future Directive that medical treatment 
abroad could be reimbursed only if the healthcare system of the home country allows 
for the reimbursement of the respective medical treatment. Furthermore, it should be 
made clear that medical treatment in another Member State would not undermine 
Member States’ healthcare systems as far as they provide benefits-in-kind healthcare 
services
81. Especially the distinction that the ECJ made between hospital and non-
hospital care seems to be unsatisfactory to Denmark: 
“In Denmark’s opinion, this distinction is based on the fact that hospital care is 
particularly costly and requires planning […] The requirement for prior approval is 
therefore accepted with regard to hospital care. However, non-hospital care can in 
some cases also be very costly and demanding, necessitating a high level of 
investment […] The Danish government therefore feels that there can be objective 
reasons also in the case of non-hospital care which can justify a restriction on the free 
exchange of healthcare services – in other words it should be possible to impose prior 
authorization”
82. 
 
The criteria for prior authorization should also be quite detailed. According to 
Denmark, prerequisites for prior authorization for hospital treatment should be that 
the hospital in the other Member State has an agreement with the competent public 
authorities in the home Member State of the patient. Moreover this Member State 
should be able to require information on the medical treatments offered by the foreign 
healthcare providers as well as on the waiting time for medical treatment
83.  
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  27As far as the supervision and quality of healthcare services is concerned, the 
responsibility for that oversight should remain with national authorities. Otherwise, 
Denmark welcomes further voluntary cooperation between Member States to better 
use free capacities and to reduce waiting time for medical treatment in hospitals
84. 
Denmark shows a very low degree of institutional adaptation. Even though it 
has partly transposed the ECJ’s rulings into national law, complete transposition has 
not occurred yet. This is due to the fact that Denmark shows a higher degree of 
institutional misfit than Germany with a social insurance system. The reason for this 
misfit is that national health systems provide universal healthcare on the basis of 
citizenship, thereby attaching much importance to the equity of access to healthcare. 
The ECJ’s rulings stipulating an individual’s right to get medical treatment if the 
home healthcare system does not meet a patient’s needs therefore touches upon the 
fundamental collective understanding attached to the Danish healthcare system. This 
can be illustrated by Denmark’s concern of discrimination against its own citizens that 
might occur due to cross-border patient mobility: if a Danish patient seeks medical 
treatment in another Member State, he is free to choose the physician who will carry 
out medical treatment. However, a patient insured under Group 1 and staying in 
Denmark cannot choose freely the physician. Only if he changed to Group 2 such a 
free choice would be possible, but it would also imply a lower reimbursement for 
medical treatment. A patient having crossed the border would not only get the full 
reimbursement, but also the free choice of a physician
85. 
The ECJ’s rulings also touch upon a key feature of political control over the 
financing of healthcare services: the control mechanism of waiting lists for the 
planning of capacities becomes less effective, as it has become easier for Danish 
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  28patients to circumvent waiting lists. Unsurprisingly, Denmark thus puts an emphasis 
on the cost control of medical treatment. According to its point-of-view, a Directive 
should not erode the political control of financing public healthcare and therefore not 
touch upon the core institutions of a national health system. The slow transposition of 
the rulings can be thus explained with the relatively high costs that will occur for 
institutional adaptation. Denmark cannot simply absorb the European requirements 
but will have to accommodate its healthcare system’s institutions to them.  
 
4. Conclusion  
Irrespective of the difference between social insurance and national health 
systems, both Member States presented here have an interest in safeguarding their 
sovereignty. A European Directive should prevent any further case law that has 
impacts on their prerogatives to organize the national healthcare services as they see 
fit. The Member States also have a common interest in clarifying the vague 
definitions of healthcare services and ‘undue delay’ in order to create legal certainty 
for them and for patients alike. Yet national health services show a higher degree of 
institutional misfit to European obligations than social insurance systems: A simple 
absorption of European obligations is for national health systems not possible as it 
was the case for Germany’s insurance system. Even though Denmark will not have to 
transform its core institutions, the adaptive pressures are higher and therefore the 
costs for institutional adaptation as well. Denmark has been thus slower in transposing 
the ECJ’s rulings into national law and waited for the negotiations on a European 
Directive. Consequentially, the political preferences and interests that the Member 
States are trying to upload are differing as much as their adaptive pressures. A 
restrictive interpretation of the ECJ’s jurisprudence is of much more importance to 
  29Denmark than to Germany that just tries to avoid further adaptive pressures. Given 
these results, the hypothesis that has been tested can be confirmed: Member States 
have shown a different degree of institutional misfit according to the distinct 
institutional set-up of their respective healthcare systems. As a consequence they also 
try to upload different preferences for a European Directive. If a convergence between 
Member States’ healthcare systems will occur, is nevertheless questionable. But given 
their preferences for further voluntary cooperation concerning quality indicators, one 
could ask if this will not entail new adaptive pressures in the long run, which in turn 
could lead to a creeping convergence. Another factor could also be the accession of 
the new Member States. These usually offer standard surgeries at a much lower price 
than the old Member States. This could enhance cross-border patient mobility as the 
price of a hip replacement for example is about 50 percent lower than in the EU 15 
countries. Hence patients could reduce their co-payments by receiving medical 
treatment abroad. It therefore seems, as pop artist Shakira beautifully sings, that “hips 
don’t lie”. 
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